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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(b)(i). 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Is it proper for a trial court to overturn a decision of a Land Use 
Appeal Board composed of lay persons, when the trial court finds that there was 
sufficient evidence to support the Board's decision but the Board failed to make 
findings with legal precision? 
Standard of Review: A District Court's ruling reversing a land use 
authority's decision is reviewed for correctness. Patterson v. Utah County Bd. of 
Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 603 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). "Since the district court's 
review of the Board's decision was limited to a review of the Board's record, we do 
not accord any particular deference to the district court's decision. Instead, we 
review the Board's decision as if the appeal had come directly from the agency. 
Thus, the standard for our review of the Board's decision is the same standard 
established in the Utah Code for the district court's review." Id.(footnotes omitted). 
This issue was preserved in Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R. 175, 183-187), and error is evident in the Memorandum 
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Decision (R. 385). 
PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTION, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-102: 
(1) The purposes of this chapter are to provide for the health, safety, 
and welfare, and promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace 
and good order, comfort, convenience, and aesthetics of each 
municipality and its present and future inhabitants and businesses, to 
protect the tax base, to secure economy in governmental expenditures, 
to foster the state's agricultural and other industries, to protect both 
urban and nonurban development, to protect and ensure access to 
sunlight for solar energy devices, to provide fundamental fairness in 
land use regulation, and to protect property values. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801: 
(3)(a) The courts shall: 
(i) presume that a decision, ordinance, or regulation made under the 
authority of this chapter is valid; and 
(ii) determine only whether or not the decision, ordinance, or 
regulation is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. 
(c) A final decision of a land use authority or an appeal authority is 
valid if the decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record 
and is not arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. 
(d) A determination of illegality requires a determination that the 
decision, ordinance, or regulation violates a law, statute, or ordinance 
in effect at the time the decision was made or the ordinance or 
regulation adopted. 
(7) (a) The land use authority or appeal authority, as the case may be, 
shall transmit to the reviewing court the record of its proceedings, 
including its minutes, findings, orders, and, if available, a true and 
correct transcript of its proceedings. 
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Logan Land Development Code: § 17.57.080: 
Appeal Meeting 
Not less than 14 days following the mailing of a public notice, the 
Board of Appeals or Board of Adjustment shall hold a public meeting 
to hear the appeal. At that meeting, the Board shall hear the Staffs 
report including a summary of the action being appealed, the testimony 
of the appellant, the testimony of the proponent, if different from the 
appellant, and any comments from the public. The Board may take 
testimony and comments from the general public, and it may consider 
new information and facts in reaching its decision. 
Logan Land Development Code: § 17.57.090: 
Decision of the Appeal 
The Board shall render its decision at the meeting by majority vote of 
the members present, unless the matter is continued to a future meeting 
pending a request of the Board for more information. The Board may 
overturn the decision-makers on the basis of its findings, it may uphold 
the decision-makers, or if new information is presented that was not 
previously presented to the decision-makers, the Board may return the 
matter to them for new proceedings. The action of the Board is the 
final administrative procedure within the City's process. 
Logan Land Development Code: § 17.57.100: 
Findings Required to Overturn or Modify the Decision-Makers Action 
If the Board overturns or modifies the action of the decision-makers, 
the Board shall make findings substantiated in conformance with the 
requirements of procedures for the type of action being appealed. If the 
Board upholds the appealed action, no additional findings are required, 
the Board's action automatically affirms the previously adopted 
findings. The Board may, upon upholding the decision-makers, add, 
clarify, or enhance findings based upon the facts of the appeal meeting. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF CASE 
This is an appeal from an Order and Judgment based on a District Court's 
Memorandum Decision that reversed the decision of the Board of Adjustment. The 
Board of Adjustment had decided that an applicant's property was a legally 
established nonconforming use. The District Court reversed the Board of 
Adjustment decision because of the manner in which the Board of Adjustment 
worded their findings. (R. 385) 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On December 17, 2006, Ray Lucherini filed an application to Determine 
Legally Existing Nonconforming Status of property located in the City of Logan. 
(R. 38). The property is owned by Ray and Carol Lucherini and the application was 
filed with the City of Logan, Department of Community Development. (R. 38). The 
application requested that the City of Logan recognize a two unit residence as a 
legally established nonconforming use, colloquially referred to as "grandfathering," 
in a single family residential zone. (R. 39). On January 5, 2007, based on 
information provided by the Lucherinis, and research conducted by city staff, the 
Department of Community Development denied the request. (R. 68). On January 
4 
19, 2007, the decision of the Department of Community Development was 
appealed. (R. 36). On March 6, 2007, the Board of Adjustment heard the 
Lucherinis' appeal. (R. 155-163). The Board of Adjustment reviewed reports 
submitted by staff (R. 155), reviewed a summary of building permits issued (R. 
164), and heard evidence presented by witnesses (R. 155-163). At the conclusion of 
the evidence, the Board of Adjustment approved a motion that the application for a 
legally established non-conforming use be approved, reversing the decision of the 
Department of Community Development. (R. 162). The findings for approval made 
by the Board of Adjustment stated: "1 . The two unit use was legally established 
based on the intent of the original construction. 2. The two unit use has been 
continuously occupied since the time of construction." (R. 163). 
On April 5, 2007, the Plaintiffs and Appellees in this case, a neighboring 
property owner, filed a Petition and Complaint with First District Court challenging 
the Board of Adjustment Decision. (R. 3-15). On November 21, 2007, the 
Defendants and Appellants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 175). On 
January 9, 2008, the Plaintiffs and Appellees filed a Cross Motion for Summary 
Judgment. (R. 229). On May 19, 2008, the District Court heard oral argument on 
the respective motions for summary judgment and ordered additional briefing (R. 
281). On June 23, 2008, the District Court heard oral argument on the respective 
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motions for summary judgment and on the additional briefing. (R. 380). On 
August 6, 2008., the District Court issued a Memorandum Decision which stated in 
relevant part: "Based on the evidence presented to the Board and in light of the 
discretion given to an administrative body's decision, had the Board of Adjustments 
expressly found that a multi-family use building permit had been issued, the Court 
would not disturb that finding." (R. 385). However, the Court found "that since the 
Board of Adjustments did not find that that multi-family building permit was ever 
actually issued, the Board's decision to grant a legal nonconforming use was 
improper as a matter of law." (R. 385). 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In October, 1960 a building permit was issued to Mrs. Nona W. Watson for a 
new home located in Logan, Utah. (R. 164). In 1978, Ray and Carol Lucherini 
purchased the home ("Lucherini home55). (R. 39). At the time the Lucherini home 
was constructed it was in located in an area that was zoned as a "Residential District 
R-2." (R. 69). Two family, three family and four family dwellings were permitted 
in Residential District R-2 zones at the time that the Lucherini home was 
constructed. (R. 169). At the time the Lucherini home was constructed, the lot size 
was sufficient to accommodate a two family home. (R. 69, 169). The zoning was 
changed where the Lucherini home is located in 1970 to Single Family Residential 
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Zone. (R. 69, 71-72). On November 17, 2006, the Lucherinis filed an Application 
to Determine Legally Existing Nonconforming status of their property requesting 
that it be considered as two units. (R. 38-39). On January 5, 2007, Jay L. Nielson, 
Director of the Department of Community Development, issued a letter to the 
Lucherinis denying their application to "grandfather" or establish the Lucherini 
property as a legally established nonconforming use because the information 
submitted did not show that the use of the property was legally established and 
continuously occupied as two units. (R. 68). The Lucherinis appealed the decision 
to deny their grandfathering request to the Board of Adjustment for the City of 
Logan. (R. 36). A hearing was held on March 6, 2007 and evidence was presented 
to the Board. (R. 155-163). At the Board of Adjustment hearing, Mr. Eric Loosle, a 
construction expert, testified and gave his opinion regarding the Lucherini home. 
(R. 156-158). Mr. Loosle indicated that there is a double electrical meter base that 
appears to be the original. (R. 156). There are also two separate power lines 
coming into the Lucherini home. (R. 156). The two meters are numbered 
consecutively. (R.156). Mr. Loosle found that there are two gas meters in the front 
of the Lucherini home. (R.156). Mr. Loosle found two furnaces in the basement. 
(R. 156). One furnace is for the home and one furnace is for the downstairs 
apartment. (R. 156). Mr. Loosle found the original lathboard was present 
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throughout the entire home consistent with construction in the early 1960's. (R. 
156, 174). Based on the appearance of the ductwork and original lathboard, Mr. 
Loosle opined that the furnaces were simultaneously installed. (R. 156). There is a 
downstairs kitchen with a panel box that is consistent with the era that the home 
was originally built. (R. 156). Mr. Loosle found a separate doorbell that rings to the 
basement. (R. 156). Mr. Loosle opined that the upstairs apartment and downstairs 
apartment were simultaneously built based on the ductwork, the type of 
construction, and the lack of any significant modification. (R. 158). A document, 
prepared by the City of Logan, containing a summary of building permits issued in 
October 1960 was presented to the Board of Adjustments. (R. 164). The original 
building permit cannot be located and has been lost. (R. 156). The summary 
contains eleven new homes. (R. 164). The cost of the building permits is based on 
the value of the homes. (R. 164). One of the homes indicates that it contains two 
apartments and is valued at $15,000.00. (R. 164). The Lucherini home is valued at 
$ 18,200.00. (EL. 164). There are only two other new homes listed that have a 
higher value than the Lucherini home. (R. 164). Mr. Kent Watson, the son of Nona 
W. Watson, also testified at the March 6, 2007 hearing. (R. 158-160). Mr. Watson 
lived in the Lucherini home when it was originally built. (R. 158). Mr. Watson 
was five years old when the home was originally built. (R. 158). Mr. Watson 
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remembers living in the basement when the home was built. (R. 158). After 
approximately five weeks, the Watson family moved to the upstairs apartment and 
rented the basement apartment. (R. 158-159). Mr. Watson remembers that there 
were tenants in the basement apartment from the time that his family moved to the 
upstairs unit. (R. 158). The basement unit was rented to Mr. Watson's sister and 
her two children for about a year after a divorce. (R. 158). Mr. Watson remembers 
that the apartment was continuously occupied while he lived at the Lucherini house 
until around 1975. (R. 158-159). Mr. Ray Lucherini testified that an east entrance 
was added in 1984. (R. 160). Prior to the installation of the east entrance, the 
apartment was accessed through the back door. (R. 160). Mr. Lucherini purchased 
the property in 1978 and it had been continuously occupied since he purchased it as 
a two family home. (R. 160). Mr. Lucherini testified that there was one flat fee for 
the electrical service but that he did apportion a part of the fee for electrical service 
to the renters. (R. 160). Mr. Edward A. Ferguson testified that he lived across the 
street since March of 1964. (R. 161.) He stated that he did not personally know 
any of the renters, but he knows that there have been renters since around 1964. (R. 
161). When he moved into his house he knew there was a rental property at this 
home. (R. 161). Surveys were conducted of property owners within 300 feet of the 
subject property to provide relevant facts on the history of the property. (R. 79-89, 
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136-142). Five neighbors who lived in the area since I960, when the Lucherini 
home was built, gave signed statements that the property was always used as a 
duplex. (R. 139-142.) The only property owner that responded that the subject 
property has not always been used as a duplex is the Plaintiffs and Appellees in this 
action. (R. 80). Brent Mortensen, a member of the Board of Adjustment, stated that 
the evidence points to two phases of construction that happened in succession. (R. 
162). The Lucherinis did obtain a building permit and had inspections so the City 
of Logan had every opportunity to observe what was going on. (R. 162). Mr. 
Mortensen stated that the Lucherinis intent should have been evident to an 
inspector. (R. 162). Mr. Mortensen stated that the City would have inspected the 
home before it was occupied and they should have put a "kibosh" on it then if there 
was a problem. (R. 162). Roylan Croshaw, a member of the Board of Adjustment, 
stated that it is obvious that the brick was not cut to add another meter and it looks 
original to him. (R. 162). He stated that since the building inspector, Mr. Ivan 
Henry, is not around to say whether they initially applied for it (the two unit 
building permit) or not, it's obvious that they passed inspection. (R. 162). Based on 
the evidence presented, the Logan City Board of Adjustment found that the 
Lucherini home was a legally established nonconforming use as a two family home. 
(R. 162-163). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The narrow issue in this case is whether it is proper for a trial court to 
overturn a decision of a Board of Adjustment, composed of lay persons, when the 
trial court finds that there was sufficient evidence to support the Board's decision, 
but finds that the Board failed to state their findings with legal precision. 
Appellants position is that it was error for the District Court to require the Board of 
Adjustment to word their findings with particular specificity when there was 
substantial evidence in the record supporting their decision. 
In the event that this Court determines a lay Board is required to make 
specific written findings with legal precision, this case should be remanded to the 
Board of Adjustment so that they may have the opportunity to correct their findings 
to be consistent with their decision. 
ARGUMENT 
A. IT WAS ERROR FOR THE DISTRICT COURT TO REQUIRE THE 
BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT TO WORD THEIR FINDINGS IN A 
PARTICULAR MANNER 
"It is well established that when courts review the actions of an 
administrative body, that body's actions are 'endowed with a presumption of 
correctness and validity which the courts should not interfere with unless it is 
shown that there is no reasonable basis to justify the action taken.'" Dairy Product 
11 
Serv. Inc. v. City ofWellsville, 2000 UT 81,1f 42, 13 P.3d 581 (citations, quotations 
omitted); see also Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of 
Springville, 1999 UT 25,124, 979 P.2d 332 (ruling that review of municipality's 
action is based on whether, in light of evidence before municipality, reasonable 
minds could reach same conclusion). In this case, the District Court found that 
"Based on the evidence presented to the Board [of Adjustment] and in light of the 
discretion given to an administrative body's decision, had the Board of Adjustments 
[sic] expressly found that a multi-family use building permit had been issued, the 
Court would not disturb that finding." (R. 385)(emphasis added). This statement 
by the District Court indicates that there was substantial evidence to support the 
conclusions of the Board of Adjustment, but that the Board of Adjustment failed to 
be more precise in their findings and list each factual component that they relied on 
to reach their ultimate conclusion. Utah law does not require that lay boards 
prepare written findings to the level of legal precision as required by the District 
Court. 
In this case, it is not disputed that a building permit was issued. (R. 164). 
The only complicating factor is that the building permit in this case is lost, and the 
contents are unknown. (R. 156). From the context of the conversation of the 
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members of the Board of Adjustment, it is evident that they considered the factual 
issue of whether the permit was for a single family residence or for a two-unit home 
and determined that must have been for a two unit residence, based on the intent of 
the original construction, and the ability of an inspector to stop construction if it 
was being illegally constructed. (R. 162). Based on this evidence, the Board of 
Adjustment decided that the property in question was legally established as a two 
unit use. (R. 162). While acknowledging the level of discretion that must be given 
administrative bodies, the District Court disregarded the decision of the Board of 
Adjustment because there is not a specific finding regarding the content of the 
permit. (R. 385). 
Utah Code Ann. Section 10-9a-801(3) provides in pertinent part: 
(a) The courts shall: 
(i) presume that a decision, ordinance, or regulation made under the 
authority of this chapter is valid; and 
(ii) determine only whether or not the decision, ordinance, or 
regulation is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. 
(c) A final decision of a land use authority or an appeal authority is 
valid if the decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record 
and is not arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. 
In this case, the Court's own Memorandum Decision suggests that there is 
substantial evidence to support the Boards' decision. (R. 385). There is no 
13 
evidence that the appeal authority acted arbitrarily or capriciously. The only 
question becomes whether the manner in which the appeal authority stated its 
findings renders their decision illegal.1 
In Bontrager Auto Serv. v. Iowa City Bd. of Adjustment, 748 N.W.2d 483, 
486 (Iowa 2008), the Iowa Supreme Court considered the adequacy of the findings 
made by a board of adjustment where a community shelter for transient housing 
applied for a special exception to a local zoning regulation to allow the construction 
of a transient housing shelter in a commercial district. In Iowa, there is a specific 
requirement that Boards of Adjustment render their decision in writing, including 
written findings of fact and conclusions of law. Id. at 487. In Bontrager Auto Serv. 
It was undisputed that the board failed to make a specific finding or conclusion in 
its written decision regarding the effect of the proposed special exception on 
property values which is required under the relevant statute. Id. Notwithstanding 
the board's failure to make a factual finding that was specifically required, the Iowa 
1. The District Court's ruling set forth in its Memorandum Decision states that 
"Utah Code Section 10-9a-802(2)(b) is clear that in a case such as this, in order for 
a nonconforming use to be legally established, a multi-family building permit must 
have been issued." (R. 385). However, such a ruling ignores well established 
equitable principles that may also be relied upon to support legal establishment. 
See e.g. Western Land Equities v. Logan, 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980); Utah County 
v. Young, 615 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1980); Salt Lake County v. Kartchner, 552 P.2d 136 
(Utah 1976). 
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Supreme Court reviewed the record and found that the board had considered and 
resolved the property value issue. Id. at 489. The Iowa Supreme Court stated: "a 
board's substantial compliance with a statutory requirement [is] satisfactory . . . the 
requirements imposed by statute upon an inferior tribunal should not be too 
technically construed, lest its efficiency be wholly paralyzed." Id. at 488. (internal 
quotations omitted) see also Timber Trails Assocs. v. Planning & Zoning Common, 
99 Conn. App. 768, 787 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007) (stating: "[Z]oning agencies 
ordinarily conduct their proceedings with some degree of informality . . . and . . . 
the reasons given by a zoning authority, presumably composed of lay persons, to 
justify its action need not be in a form to satisfy the meticulous criterion of a legal 
expert.'1 (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)) The Iowa Supreme 
Court concluded the board's failure to make a specific finding is not a fatal flaw 
that warrants reversal. Bontrager Auto Serv., 748 N.W.2d 483 at 490. 
Utah law does not require that a board of adjustment make specific written 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Utah Code Ann. Section 10-9a-801(3)(c) 
provides that: "The final decision of a land use authority or an appeal authority is 
valid if the decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record and is not 
arbitrary, capricious, or illegal." (emphasis added). The record in an appeal from a 
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land use authority includes the Boards of Adjustment "minutes, findings, orders, 
and, if available, a true and correct transcript of its proceedings." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 10-9a-801(7)(a). In this case, the District Court's ruling indicates that there is 
substantial evidence to support the decision when looking at the whole record, 
including the minutes, because it states that "Based on the evidence presented to the 
Board and in light of the discretion given to an administrative body's decision, had 
the Board of Adjustments expressly found that a multi-family use building permit 
had been issued, the Court would not disturb that finding'" (R. 385)(emphasis 
added). A District Court, when reviewing a record created by a land use appeal 
board composed of lay persons should look at the whole record and not require 
such and exacting standard on how their findings are drafted when the ultimate 
conclusion is supported by the evidence in the record. 
Even District Courts in this State are not held to this exacting standard with 
respect to their findings when the evidence supports their ultimate conclusion. In 
Bailey v. Bayles, 2001 UT App 34, P9 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) this Court stated: "It is 
well-established that [we] may affirm a 'judgment, order, or decree appealed from if 
it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record/ even though 
that ground or theory was not identified by the lower court as the basis of its 
ruling." Id. (citing Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1260 (Utah 1998) (quoting Limb 
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v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n., 23 Utah 2d 222, 461 P.2d 290, 293 n.2 (Utah 
1969)); see also Bagshaw v. Bagshaw, 788 P.2d 1057, 1060 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). 
"This is a long established practice of appellate courts both in 
and out of Utah. See, e.g., 5 CJ.S. Appeal and Error § 714 ("the 
appellate court will affirm the judgment, order, or decree appealed 
from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent from 
the record"); see also Rasmussen v. Davis, 1 Utah 2d 96, 262 P.2d 488, 
489 (Utah 1953) (holding that it is the accepted policy of the court to 
affirm a trial court's ruling on other grounds "if the conclusion 
reached, though based on incorrect reasons, is in fact correct for some 
other reason" (footnote omitted))." 
Bailey v. Bayles, 2001 UT App 34, P9 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). 
If a District Court's decisions would be affirmed on any legal ground or 
theory apparent from the record, even if it was not identified as the basis for it's 
ruling, then certainly it is not reasonable for the District Court to require land use 
appeals board, comprised of lay persons, to identify specific written factual findings 
that establish each component of their ultimate conclusion when it would otherwise 
uphold the decision based on the whole record. This is especially true when there is 
no statutory requirement to make any specific findings of fact. 
In Binkerdv. Thompson, 2002 ML 1399, 20 (Mont. Dist. Ct. 2002), the 
Montana Court reviewed a challenge to a board of adjustment decision because 
Board did not make findings of fact. Id. at 15. The Montana Court concluded that 
17 
because the Montana statute only required that the Board render a "decision" and 
prepare minutes of the public hearing, the lack of written findings of fact did not 
require reversal of the Board of Adjustment decision. Id. at 28 but cf Juroszek v. 
City of Sheridan Bd. of Adjustment, 948 P.2d 1370 (Wyo. 1997)(reversing a Board 
of Adjustment decision for failing to make statutorily required findings). If written 
findings of fact are not required and it is the ultimate decision of a land use 
authority that is subject to appellate review, it is error for a District Court to reverse 
the decision of a land use authority, which is supported by the whole record, when 
the findings may not be drafted with legal precision. 
In the case before this Court, the result is particularly egregious for the 
Lucherinis' and their relative property interests. This is because, after the City of 
Logan lost the building permit for their property, the Lucherinis followed proper 
procedure and filed an application to grandfather their property. (R. 156, 38-39). 
After the staff denied their application, the Lucherinis followed the proper 
procedure and appealed their case to the Board of Adjustment. (R. 36). At the 
Board of Adjustment hearing, the Lucherinis presented substantial evidence and 
testimony regarding their legally established use and ultimately won their case only 
to have the District Court reverse the Board of Adjustment decision because the 
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findings, which were prepared by City staff at the end of the minutes, did not 
specifically list each element of fact that supported the Board of Adjustment's 
ultimate conclusion. (R. 165, 385). The District Court ruling places form over 
substance and is contrary to the one of the purposes of the Municipal Land Use, 
Development, and Management Act which is "to provide fundamental fairness in 
land use regulation." Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-102(1). This Court should reverse 
the District Court and uphold the findings of the City of Logan, Board of 
Adjustment. 
B. IN THE EVENT THAT THIS COURT RULES THAT THE BOARD OF 
ADJUSTMENT MUST WORD THEIR FINDINGS IN A PARTICULAR 
MANNER, THIS CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED SO THAT THE BOARD 
OF ADJUSTMENT CAN MAKE SPECIFIC FINDINGS 
After reversing the City of Logan Board of Adjustment decision for failing to 
state their findings in a particular manner, the District Court granted Plaintiffs' 
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 385). The Order and Judgment in this 
case vacates the decision of the City of Logan Board of Adjustment. (R. 388). If 
the decision of an administrative board is reversed for failure to make any required 
findings, the "appropriate procedural step is to remand to the Board . . . " to make 
any findings required by law. See Arrow Legal Solutions Group, P.C. v. Dep't of 
Workforce Servs., 2007 UT App 9, PI5 (Utah Ct. App. 2007). Appellant is unable 
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to find any case in Utah that requires a board comprised of lay persons to state their 
findings with legal precision. Since the District Court's ruling apparently states a 
new legal principle, the decision of the Board of Adjustment should not be vacated. 
The principles of appellate review of administrative boards and fundamental 
fairness require that the case be remanded to the Board of Adjustment. It was error 
for the District Court to vacate the decision of the Board of Adjustment without 
remanding the case for the purpose of giving the Board of Adjustment the 
opportunity to make any specific findings that District Court requires. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, this Court should reverse the Memorandum Decision of the 
First District Court and uphold the findings of the City of Logan Board of 
Adjustment. In the alternative, this Court should remand the case to the First 
District Court with instructions to remand the case to the City of Logan Board of 
Adjustment to any findings required by law. 
Dated this / yL day of January, 2008 
Kym6er D. Housley 
Attorney of Record 
City Attorney 
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Kymber Housley, Bar # 6892 
Lee Edwards, Bar #7513 
City of Logan Corporation 
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Logan, Utah 84321 
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Attorneys for TVfuulanis ami Appellants 
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Egan Anderson, the counsel for the Plaintiffs and Appellees in the matter, by 
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Kevin Egan Anderson 
ANDERSON CALL 
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Kevin Egan Anderson (0099) 
ANDERSON CALL & WILKINSON 
1200 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone: (801)521-3434 
Fax: (801)521-3484 
Attorney for Petitioners 
IN THE DISTRICT' COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NORMA J. THOMPSON, TRUSTEE OF 
THE NORMA J. THOMPSON TRUST, 
NORMA J. THOMPSON, individually, 
CONLEY J. THOMPSON and 
SHANNA J.THOMPSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
LOGAN CITY, a municipal corporation, 
the LOGAN CITY BOARD OF 
ADJUSTMENTS and MEMBERS OF 
THE LOGAN CITY BOARD OF 
ADJUSTMENTS IN THEIR OFFICIAL 
CAPACITY, and JOHN DOES 1-10, 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Case No. 070100752 
Judge: Kevin Allen 
Pursi:.,' .;. >cciiun;-> 10-9a-103(28), 10-9a-802(2)(b), and 10-9a-
802(3)(c) and in accordance with the Court's August 8, 2008 Men- •••...-. >.v •*• -n. 
and lor good cause shown, 
00038] 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows: 
1. That Defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied and Plaintiffs' 
cross-motion for summary judgment is granted, on the basis that the Board of 
Adjustments merely found that the nonconfonning use had been established by the 
"intent of the original construction," which is insufficient as a matter of law. 
2. Consequently, the March 6, 2007 Logan City Board of Adjustment 
decision to grant a legal nonconforming use permitting multi-family uses foi the 
Lucherini home was and is improper as a matter of law, pursuant to Utah Code Sections 
10-9a-103(28), 10-9a-802(2)(b), and 10-9a-802(3)(c) and is hereby vacated. 
3. Based on the foregoing, all issues in this case are resolved and final 
judgment is entered for the Plaintiff. 
MADE AKL' FNTHREDi.i. this 2j day of t^epfc , ,2008. 
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PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTION, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Logan Land Development Code: §17.57.080: 
Appeal Meeting 
Not less than 14 days following the mailing of a public notice, 
the Board of Appeals or Board of Adjustment shall hold a 
public meeting to hear the appeal. At that meeting, the Board 
shall hear the Staffs report including a summary of the action 
being appealed, the testimony of the appellant, the testimony of 
the proponent, if different from the appellant, and any 
comments from the public. The Board may take testimony and 
comments from the general public, and it may consider new 
information and facts in reaching its decision. 
Logan Land Development Code: §17.57.090: 
Decision of the Appeal 
The Board shall render its decision at the meeting by majority 
vote of the members present, unless the matter is continued to a 
future meeting pending a request of the Board for more 
information. The Board may overturn the decision-makers on 
the basis of its findings, it may uphold the decision-makers, or 
if new information is presented that was not previously 
presented to the decision-makers, the Board may return the 
matter to them for new proceedings. The action of the Board is 
the final administrative procedure within the City's process. 
Logan Land Development Code: § 17.57.100: 
Findings Required to Overturn or Modify the Decision-Makers Action 
If the Board overturns or modifies the action of the decision-makers, 
the Board shall make findings substantiated in conformance with the 
requirements of procedures for the type of action being appealed. If 
the Board upholds the appealed action, no additional findings are 
required, the Board's action automatically affirms the previously 
adopted findings. The Board may, upon upholding the decision-
makers, add, clarify, or enhance findings based upon the facts of the 
appeal meeting. 
78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs 
and to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction 
of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service 
Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands 
Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions 
reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources, 
Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the 
state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63G-3-602; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by 
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except 
petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs 
challenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases 
involving a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, 
including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of 
four judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original 
appellate review and determination any matter over which the Court of 
Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 
63 G, Chapter 4, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency 
adjudicative proceedings. 
10-9a-102. Purposes ~ General land use authority. 
(1) The purposes of this chapter are to provide for the health, safety, and 
welfare, and promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace and good 
order, comfort, convenience, and aesthetics of each municipality and its 
present and future inhabitants and businesses, to protect the tax base, to 
secure economy in governmental expenditures, to foster the state's 
agricultural and other industries, to protect both urban and nonurban 
development, to protect and ensure access to sunlight for solar energy 
devices, to provide fundamental fairness in land use regulation, and to 
protect property values. 
(2) To accomplish the purposes of this chapter, municipalities may enact 
all ordinances, resolutions, and rules and may enter into other forms of land 
use controls and development agreements that they consider necessary or 
appropriate for the use and development of land within the municipality, 
including ordinances, resolutions, rules, restrictive covenants, easements, 
and development agreements governing uses, density, open spaces, 
structures, buildings, energy efficiency, light and air, air quality, 
transportation and public or alternative transportation, infrastructure, street 
and building orientation and width requirements, public facilities, 
fundamental fairness in land use regulation, considerations of surrounding 
land uses and the balance of the foregoing purposes with a landowner's 
private property interests, height and location of vegetation, trees, and 
landscaping, unless expressly prohibited by law. 
10-9a-801. No district court review until administrative remedies 
exhausted — Time for filing — Tolling of time — Standards governing 
court review — Record on review — Staying of decision. 
(1) No person may challenge in district court a municipality's land use 
decision made under this chapter, or under a regulation made under authority 
of this chapter, until that person has exhausted the person's administrative 
remedies as provided in Part 7, Appeal Authority and Variances, if 
applicable. 
(2) (a) Any person adversely affected by a final decision made in the 
exercise of or in violation of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition 
for review of the decision with the district court within 30 days after the 
local land use decision is final. 
(b) (i) The time under Subsection (2)(a) to file a petition is tolled from the 
date a property owner files a request for arbitration of a constitutional taking 
issue with the property rights ombudsman under Section 13-43-204 until 30 
days after: 
(A) the arbitrator issues a final award; or 
(B) the property rights ombudsman issues a written statement under 
Subsection 13-43-204(3)(b) declining to arbitrate or to appoint an arbitrator. 
(ii) A tolling under Subsection (2)(b)(i) operates only as to the specific 
constitutional taking issue that is the subject of the request for arbitration 
filed with the property rights ombudsman by a property owner. 
(iii) A request for arbitration filed with the property rights ombudsman 
after the time under Subsection (2)(a) to file a petition has expired does not 
affect the time to file a petition. 
(3) (a) The courts shall: 
(i) presume that a decision, ordinance, or regulation made under the 
authority of this chapter is valid; and 
(ii) determine only whether or not the decision, ordinance, or regulation 
is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. 
(b) A decision, ordinance, or regulation involving the exercise of 
legislative discretion is valid if it is reasonably debatable that the decision, 
ordinance, or regulation promotes the purposes of this chapter and is not 
otherwise illegal. 
(c) A final decision of a land use authority or an appeal authority is valid 
if the decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record and is not 
arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. 
(d) A determination of illegality requires a determination that the 
decision, ordinance, or regulation violates a law, statute, or ordinance in 
effect at the time the decision was made or the ordinance or regulation 
adopted. 
(4) The provisions of Subsection (2)(a) apply from the date on which the 
municipality takes final action on a land use application for any adversely 
affected third party, if the municipality conformed with the notice provisions 
of Part 2, Notice, or for any person who had actual notice of the pending 
decision. 
(5) If the municipality has complied with Section 10-9a-205, a challenge 
to the enactment of a land use ordinance or general plan may not be filed 
with the district court more than 30 days after the enactment. 
(6) The petition is barred unless it is filed within 30 days after the appeal 
authority's decision is final. 
(7) (a) The land use authority or appeal authority, as the case may be, 
shall transmit to the reviewing court the record of its proceedings, including 
its minutes, findings, orders, and, if available, a true and correct transcript of 
its proceedings. 
(b) If the proceeding was tape recorded, a transcript of that tape recording 
is a true and correct transcript for purposes of this Subsection (7). 
(8) (a) (i) If there is a record, the district court's review is limited to the 
record provided by the land use authority or appeal authority, as the case 
may be. 
(ii) The court may not accept or consider any evidence outside the record 
of the land use authority or appeal authority, as the case may be, unless that 
evidence was offered to the land use authority or appeal authority, 
respectively, and the court determines that it was improperly excluded. 
(b) If there is no record, the court may call witnesses and take evidence. 
(9) (a) The filing of a petition does not stay the decision of the land use 
authority or authority appeal authority, as the case may be. 
(b) (i) Before filing a petition under this section or a request for 
mediation or arbitration of a constitutional taking issue under Section 13-43-
204, the aggrieved party may petition the appeal authority to stay its 
decision. 
(ii) Upon receipt of a petition to stay, the appeal authority may order its 
decision stayed pending district court review if the appeal authority finds it 
to be in the best interest of the municipality. 
(iii) After a petition is filed under this section or a request for mediation 
or arbitration of a constitutional taking issue is filed under Section 13-43-
204, the petitioner may seek an injunction staying the appeal authority's 
decision. 
